IN LIGHT OF THE ESCALATING DEBATE OVER THE INDO-EUROPEAN CORRIDOR, THE ARTICLE TRACES PREVIOUS STEPS IN ATTEMPTS TO MARGINALIZE EGYPT, FROM THE CLUB OF INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL.
In 2020, MRLB , owned by the UAE's Petromal Group (based in Abu Dhabi), was signing a memorandum of understanding for the passage of UAE oil from Israel's EAPC pipeline, stretching from Eilat on the Red Sea to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean, for re-offloading and export to Europe. The deal was valued at $700 million in favor of the state-owned Israeli line.
Emirati oil exported to Europe passed through two main routes, the first through the Suez Canal. As for the second, a number of containers were unloaded at the port of Ain Sokhna through the SUMED pipeline to the port of Sidi Kerir near Alexandria and then to the Mediterranean Sea and Europe. The diversion of part of the UAE's oil from Ain Sokhna to Eilat was an indication of the UAE's desire to shift policies as well.
The UAE's oil transport project via EAPC has been frozen due to objections by environmental activists to the potential environmental damage, and the Israeli government has halted the project until further notice. But the significance remains strong: Israel will soon be the first to take care of!
Intersection of international and regional projects
Beginning in 2020, after the signing of the Abraham Accords, reports emerged in Israel of a project linking Abu Dhabi to Haifa via railways that transported part of the Gulf's trade to Israel's Mediterranean ports and linked Israel geopolitically and economically to the Gulf. However, the reports were described as exaggerated and imaginary as the bulk of the project's imagined railways passed through Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has been still reluctant to enter into open relations with Israel, especially since it does not benefit greatly from the UAE-Israel linkage.
The solution to the political dilemma to turn fantasy into reality was to expand the return from the project to entice Saudi Arabia. This was achieved by extending the project’s geographical reach to include India in the east and Europe in the west. Additionally, the project’s geopolitical scope was widened to involve the United States, which is keen on curbing China’s growth and countering the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. This is done through establishing trade routes parallel to those of China, thereby diminishing China’s influence in the Middle East and Europe.
Egypt's attendance at the recent G-20 summit (September 10-2023) was deservedly dramatic. Egypt, which has historically been invited to most of the region's conflict and military confrontations, is now called upon to witness for itself the official announcement of its departure from the club of Abrahamic interests in the Middle East.
On the first day of the G-20 summit, the Israeli imagination became a transnational reality. The leaders of the United States, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union announced that they had signed a memorandum of understanding outlining a plan to create an economic corridor between India, the Middle East and Europe. The route consists of a sea passage from Mumbai to Jebel Ali in the UAE, then a railway route crossing Saudi Arabia and Jordan ending with the Israeli port of Haifa to trans-ship goods on a sea route from Haifa to Piraeus in Greece and from there to all parts of Europe by road. Compared to the Suez Canal route, the corridor is intended to reduce shipping time between the Indian ports of Mumbai and Greek Piraeus by 40%. The project still seems fanciful due to its logistical complexity, but now the fantasy is supported by the perceptions of major international powers and not just an isolated Israeli illusion.
Reining in China was not the only goal of establishing the Indian corridor, as there are important regional reasons, which is the completion of Israel's integration into a Middle Eastern system linking it to the new Middle East centers, namely Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, after the old centers suffering from major economic and demographic crises were excluded. After Israel's political integration through the Abraham Accords, attempts to integrate it into the Middle East were also made through military cooperation agreements and a joint air defense initiative with a number of Arab countries. The Indian Corridor was the third side needed for Israel's economic integration after its political and security integration. However, this integration came at a cost. It meant carving out a portion of a large Arab country, Egypt, which until recently was the most influential country in the region and still has the largest population. This was particularly challenging given that Egypt is already dealing with major economic crises.
Egyptian Response!
Egypt did not officially respond to the draft, but some responses came from unofficial sources. Among them are responses from pro-regime pages on social networking sites that this road cannot compete with the Suez Canal in any way. This is the same response stated by Lieutenant General Mohab Mamish, former head of the Suez Canal Authority, who considered that the road has no impact on the Suez Canal. These responses bear part of the validity. It is inconceivable that a corridor that integrates land sea routes would surpass the Suez Canal, but it would inevitably cut part of its share if it were completed, and the Egyptian leadership continued to ignore its potential effects.
More seriously, the corridor is part of attempts to marginalize Egypt and exclude it from the club of regional interests. These attempts, which began with the signing of the Abraham Accords between Israel and Arab countries, were complemented by the exclusion of Egypt from Mediterranean energy cooperation alliances. The Indian corridor's announcement was preceded by Israel, Greece and Cyprus announcing on September 4 the strengthening of a strategic energy alliance, excluding Cairo, which has been an active ally in this regard in the past few years.
Egyptian Response Capabilities
Egypt appears to some parties in Europe as a sick man in the Middle East burdened with chronic economic problems and a huge and mostly angry population. This threatens to increase migration rates across the Mediterranean to escape the crisis. It appears to other parties in the Gulf as an economic burden that is unable to overcome its crises and continues only with external aid. In any case, the parties agreed to marginalize Egypt.
But Egypt is capable of changing its recent picture. It still has the most important sea lane in the region with the potential to improve its services to make the canal more competitive from the loading and unloading complexities associated with the alternative corridor. Egypt also still has the capabilities to influence the international scene and exploit the Sino-American rivalry and regional rivalries to its advantage. The same approach taken by both the UAE and Saudi Arabia in pressuring the United States by showing rapprochement with China has led the United States to consider rehabilitating its relationship with the Gulf.
Egypt is still able to overcome attempts to marginalize it and exploit international contradictions to its advantage. However, this requires a shift in its development policies, moving away from a reliance on constant debt that undermines its capacity to exert influence. Additionally, Egypt needs to abandon its policy of regional contraction and free-riding, and instead play a more proactive role in regional and global arrangements. The most present lesson in the current Middle Eastern landscape is that foreign policy is not a marginal practice that states have the luxury of dispensing with.
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