The withdrawal of the Janjaweed from Khartoum marks a pivotal moment in Sudan's ongoing war. Just months ago, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overran the capital, seizing the presidential palace and Khartoum airport, asserting dominance in a conflict that has reshaped Sudan's political and military landscape. Now, with the Sudanese army reclaiming control, a critical question arises: Does this retreat signal the end of the war, or is it merely a shift in the battlefield dynamics?
How Did the Janjaweed Lose Their Hold on Khartoum?
1. From a Force of Fear to a Hunted Militia
The Janjaweed initially relied on brutal "shock and awe" tactics to establish control. However, their widespread abuses—looting, sexual violence, and mass killings—alienated the civilian population. In wars of attrition, winning over local communities can be as decisive as military strength, and the RSF failed on this front.
Rather than securing loyalty or at least neutrality, they provoked widespread resistance. Groups that had previously remained neutral joined the fight against them, providing intelligence and logistical support to the army. As a result, the RSF not only faced military opposition but also an increasingly hostile urban population, further undermining their ability to hold the capital.
2. Internal Fractures: A War on Multiple Fronts
Unlike a conventional military, the RSF is a fragmented militia with deep tribal loyalties, primarily controlled by the Dagalo family and Rizeigat tribal leaders. While gold revenues initially sustained their cohesion, prolonged fighting and resource distribution disparities triggered internal dissent.
One of the most significant blows to their unity came when Abu Aqla Kikel, a key commander from central Sudan, led a major defection, taking with him Sudan Shield forces—an ethnically distinct faction from the RSF’s Arab-dominated western Sudanese base. This exposed a critical contradiction in Hemedti's rhetoric: he entered the war claiming to fight marginalization, yet his leadership marginalized key allies. This betrayal shattered the illusion of RSF unity, weakening their military position.
3. The Hidden Hand: Foreign Intervention Shifted the Balance
Beyond internal conflicts, a major shift in firepower and strategy played a crucial role in the RSF’s retreat. Reports suggest Egypt provided airstrikes and military planning support, while other sources point to Turkish-supplied Bayraktar drones assisting the Sudanese army.
A key moment fueling these claims came when Sudanese soldiers, upon reaching the abandoned Egyptian embassy in Khartoum, posted a video thanking Egypt—a subtle but telling indication of external support. Meanwhile, Hemedti himself accused Cairo of targeting his forces.
Whether through precise airstrikes or strategic military guidance, external assistance appears to have played a decisive role in cutting off RSF supply lines, isolating them inside Khartoum, and ultimately forcing their withdrawal.
Is the War Really Over?
Despite this major victory for the Sudanese army, Sudan’s war is far from over. The conflict has deep historical roots, particularly the longstanding tensions between the central government and marginalized regions. Furthermore, external actors—most notably the UAE, which continues to back Hemedti to secure its gold trade interests—complicate any resolution.
Additionally, the widespread militarization of civilians and proliferation of weapons mean that new fronts could emerge, even as one battle ends. The army’s call for civilians to mobilize against the RSF may have helped secure Khartoum, but it also raises concerns about prolonged instability and fragmented armed resistance in the future.
The army’s victory in Khartoum is undeniably a turning point, but it does not mark the war’s conclusion. The Janjaweed may have lost the capital, but have they been defeated entirely? The answer remains uncertain.
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